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Introduction
Mills (1959) maintains that ‘(t)here is no way in which any social scientist can avoid assum-
ing choices of value and implying them in his [sic] work as a whole’ (emphasis added). In 
this paper I go further, arguing that educational research on higher education does not pay 
suicient heed to the cultures of valuation (Haiven, 2014; Lilley & Papadopoulos, 2014) 
in which it is embedded. Cultures of valuation furnish the context for judgements about 
value, act as mechanisms through which value is attributed and ofer lenses through which 
it comes to be recognised. My interest therefore is in the antecedent inluences cultures of 
valuation exert on educational research on higher education, and speciically on analyses of 
its value. I proceed on the premise that research seems predicated on ideas about the value 
of higher education that are more oten implied and assumed than established. Moreover, 
research on and ideas about the value of higher education that aim to sidestep the prevailing 
terms of the debate oten do so by attending to what higher education might be or ought to 
be (inter alia Barnett, 1990; Blake, Smith, & Standish, 1998; Boni & Walker, 2013; George, 
2014; Mcmahon, 2009; Newman, 1852/2014) rather than what it is (Boni & Gasper, 2012). 
ABSTRACT
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Such visions for an imagined future are essential, but if they remain unsupported by difer-
entiated, empirically defensible accounts about its value in the here and now they can also 
be summarily dismissed as idealised or ideological.
he paper is organised into two broad sections. In the irst I expand on the contentions 
made above by outlining two cultures of valuation, privileged intrinsicality and (bio)inan-
cialisation. I argue that the cultures of valuation in which research is currently embedded 
are reproducing the very understandings such research may be seeking to challenge or 
transform. Because I maintain that it is vital to do more than critique, in the second section 
I outline an alternative culture of valuation, starting with the concept of ‘lay normativity’ 
(sometimes LN for convenience), that is people’s irst-person evaluative orientation to the 
world (Sayer, 2011, p. 2). I then borrow key concepts and ideas from the capability approach 
(sometimes CA for convenience) to support a discussion of the inluence of LN on research 
on (the value of) higher education. hrough a consideration of the capability approach 
I show how lay normativity as a culture of valuation can be ‘shown to have happened’ 
(hompson, 1966, p. 9) in the practice of analysis of research.
I locate the points I make on the higher education landscape of the UK, or more accu-
rately of England because the paradoxically fragmenting and stratifying efects of globali-
sation also entail the need for greater attention to be paid to national settings (Goodson & 
Lindblad, 2011). his does not imply that my arguments are relevant only in this context, 
but it does emphasise the need for contextual speciicity. he paper contributes to an inter-
rogation of educational research in general (Hattam & Smyth, 2014), of research into higher 
education particularly and ultimately of the value of higher education itself.
Detecting cultures of valuation in research on higher education
Research on the value of higher education tends to focus on employment and earnings, 
and/or to be framed in economic terms, as the ‘returns to higher education’ (Bukodi & 
Goldthorpe, 2011; Department for Business Innovation & Skills [BIS], 2011, 2013) rather 
than as what matters to people (which may or may not include economic considerations). 
Moreover this research tends to concentrate on (pre-)applicants to and students in higher 
education. Although the latter can, at best, only predict or surmise what its value might be, 
their predictions are oten taken as a proxy for knowledge in this context. By focusing on 
the prediction of value we overlook a good number of things: how the value of higher edu-
cation actually articulates with lived realities; the things that matter to people in their own 
lives (Sayer, 2011); and the diversity of what matters to people and how that is inluenced by 
social and geographical location. Analyses of the extent to which dominant narratives about 
value can rise above material reality (Goodson, 2013, p. 13; Smith quoted in Salmon, 2010, 
p. 5) and how individual notions of ‘value’ are always and already embedded in dominant 
cultures of valuation are also paid scant regard.
Archer (2003) for example notes that the working-class respondents in her research 
‘seemed to value higher education in primarily economic and instrumental terms’ (p. 123, 
emphasis added), ‘(e)choing, to some extent, dominant government rhetoric’ (p. 23, emphasis 
added). But she also points out that many of these respondents did diferentiate between 
the personal, the family and the state in their assessments of economic value. his con-
irms Sayer’s (2011) contention that people ‘regularly engage in reasoning about how to 
value things’ (p. 23), and that arguments about valuations in everyday life are not ‘merely 
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arbitrary, a matter of assertion or power’ (p. 23). Archer’s respondents were clear about this 
(value equates to the potential to support family). But they could have little idea about the 
experience of higher education prior to entering a higher education institution. Nor could 
they have experience of being a graduate or of having a degree (Jenkins, Jones, & Ward, 
2001). herefore they had to avail themselves of prevailing and dominant discourse to some 
extent, to ill the gaps let by their lack of actual experience or knowledge.
It is vital not to (mis)take this reading of Archer as critique, particularly as the study 
expands the parameters of what might legitimately be included in analyses of value. Archer’s 
study serves here as a vehicle to highlight the absence of a lexicon of value that fully and 
unambiguously expresses what matters to the individuals concerned. I will return to this 
point in the second part of the paper but irst I set out two prevailing cultures of valuation 
and their inluence on the shape and direction of research on higher education.
Two cultures of valuation
In this part of the paper I focus on two cultures of valuation specific to higher education. 
The first of these, what I term privileged intrinsicality, is epitomised by the primacy of 
ideas about the inherent, even transcendental value of higher education. Its influence 
on evaluations of higher education is manifested through the articulation of a sense 
of loss and nostalgia, and an often unarticulated, but nevertheless strong, feeling of its 
inherent superiority to economic discourses. The second culture of valuation to which I 
attend here is (bio)financialisation or ‘the financialisation of everyday life, subjectivity, 
ecology and materiality’ (Lilley & Papadopoulos, 2014, p. 973). This might be seen as 
diametrically opposed to privileged intrinsicality in that it expresses the idea that ‘the 
worth of goods, things, activities and spaces can be essentially translated into financial 
evaluations’ (Lilley & Papadopoulos, 2014, p. 974, emphasis in the original). However, 
Halsey, Heath, and Ridge (1980) are to my mind correct in identifying a tendency in 
academic educational research (and this might more readily be identified as a generally 
pernicious academic habit) to adopt dichotomised positions, which in turn excludes, 
or at least circumscribes, the possibility of nuance and complexity. Therefore these two 
cultures of valuation do not exist at either end of a spectrum but actually in relation 
to each other. The intrinsic worth of higher education is to a great extent recognised 
as such inasmuch as it is ‘other’ to ideas about value that can be expressed in financial 
terms (although it must be noted that (bio)financialisation as a culture of value attaches 
a price even to intangibles such as knowledge).
The culture of privileged intrinsicality
I have devised the concept of privileged intrinsicality with reference to Scott’s (1995) criti-
cism that the ‘massiication’ of higher education has led to nostalgia for the days when higher 
education was an elite pursuit. It signiies that there is an oten unchallenged assumption 
that higher education, like education, is valuable in and of itself. his idea is deep seated 
and both colours and contextualises this area of educational research. A commonality of 
understanding concerning the concept ‘higher education’ is assumed rather than established 
and there have been relatively few works that attempt to theorise higher education (Scott, 
1995; Walker & Boni, 2013).
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Despite, or perhaps because of, the absence of empirically defensible theories of higher 
education, to suggest that higher education might not serve the interests of particular con-
stituencies can too easily be construed as a ‘backlash’ (University Alliance, 2014), or as an 
attempt to place higher education beyond their reach (Watts, 2009). When Wolf (2002) 
suggested, for example, that ‘(j)ust because (education) is valuable, it does not follow that 
yet more of it is by deinition a good idea; that any addition, any increment, must be wel-
comed’ (p. xi), she felt she was being judged as ‘somewhere between an animal hater and an 
imbecile’ (p. xi). As Lilley and Papadopoulos assert in respect of bioinancialisation, but the 
salience of their argument might easily be extended to other cultures of valuation including 
privileged intrinsicality, ‘even those social groups that are potentially able to challenge its 
legitimacy cannot do it without challenging their very existence’ (2014, p. 975).
Much research on higher education is critical of the (over)emphasis on its instrumental 
value, particularly in terms of preparation for the employment market. At the same time 
this research leaves untroubled the notion that higher education has inalienable value and, 
perhaps in combination with the vested interests of the academic community, critiques 
remain within a culture of privileged intrinsicality. his culture is made known through 
its opposition to instrumentalisation. I am not implying that higher education never is 
or should be an end in itself. But it is one thing to say that higher education has intrinsic 
value; it is another to transform this claim into an entire culture of value attribution. his 
transformation serves to regulate the depth and reach of analysis and commentary in (at 
least) three signiicant ways.
First, this transformation disavows the ways in which higher education always and already 
has instrumental value and a purpose, whether that be the satisfaction of an individual thirst 
for knowledge or a love of study; the provision of policy solutions to concerns about social 
mobility, social justice and the needs of the knowledge economy (Bowes, homas, Peck, & 
Nathwani, 2013); the maintenance of class privilege; or some other noble purpose (Robbins, 
1963). An instrumental purpose may be more or less quantiiable, but that does not legit-
imise discounting certain forms of instrumentality while criticising others. Moreover, the 
contemporary foregrounding of one instrumental purpose of higher education, namely its 
value to the economy, can be seen as a mere shit in emphasis rather than a rupture with 
the past (McNicol, 2004). And yet instead of tracing undulations in the meaning of value, 
arguments tend to proceed on the assumption that conceptualising higher education as a 
tool for the achievement of personal or political goals is something novel, representing a 
break with the past (Blake et al., 1998; Bradford & Hey, 2007; Stevens, 2004).
Second, transforming the claim for the intrinsic value of higher education into a culture 
of value attribution privileges a particular form of higher education, oten labelled a ‘liberal’ 
higher education. his is a broad term, which on its most basic interpretation foregrounds 
the study of subjects that have no explicit vocational or technical focus. A liberal higher 
education is not without instrumental value inasmuch as it serves the formation of the ‘well-
rounded citizen’, a term which is not only value but class laden (Bradford & Hey, 2007). his 
kind of education is positioned as intrinsically more valuable than others. In conjunction 
with a perceived shit to the instrumental purposes of higher education, the tenor of the cri-
tiques becomes one of ‘grief for lost intimacy’ (Scott, 1995, p. 7). his is evident for example 
in Barnett (1990). He states that the ‘historical conception of higher education as standing 
for intrinsically worthwhile ends – essentially the idea of liberal higher education – is being 
lost from sight’ (p. x, emphasis added). Missing from such accounts is the possibility that a 
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‘liberal education’ might be ‘rooted in subtle and stealthy socialisation and acculturation 
rather than explicit intellectual formation’ (Scott, 1995, p. 2).
hird, eliding the speciic meaning of the value of higher education within a more expan-
sive and general notion of value ignores the experience of some groups of students, erasing 
the role and mediating inluence of gender, class, (dis)ability and ethnicity, and pre-empt-
ing what might actually matter to people (Sayer, 2011; Watts & Bridges, 2006). For some 
students, study for instrumental reasons – because it leads directly to a job for example 
(Bhatti, 2003) – or because it is necessary for entry to a particular profession (Milburn, 
2012) might be more valuable than study for knowledge acquisition per se. he beneits of 
a liberal education cannot be assumed to apply evenly.
Failure to focus on the contextualising culture of valuation here does a disservice to the 
agency of individual actors, and it isolates those actors from the forces that are brought to 
bear on the processes of individual and collective value attribution. For example, criticising 
the emphasis on employability in higher education fails to address how being ill-equipped 
to deal with the stratifying efects of a globalised labour market impacts more negatively 
on some people than on others. Privileging the intrinsic worth of higher education there-
fore omits, or at the very least truncates, questions about who is doing the valuing, from 
which vantage point, for what reason and at which point in time. It assumes instead a set of 
universal, inviolable and oten invisible criteria for judgements about value that are largely 
impervious to both historicity and to the multiplicity of social conditions and human life.
The culture of (bio)inancialisation
In the previous section I argued that privileged intrinsicality as a culture of valuation is to 
some extent salient precisely because of the prevalent idea, even fear, that the value of higher 
education is being reduced to the economic and the mercantile. However, the reduction 
of the value of higher education to its ‘contribution to more general economic and social 
redistribution’ (Preston and Green, 2003, p. 4, cited in Department for Business Innovation 
& Skills [BIS], 2013) itself relects embeddedness in a particular culture of valuation that 
might be described as inancialisation (Dowling & Harvie, 2014; Haiven, 2014; Martin, 
2002), but which Lilley and Papadopoulos (2014) designate as ‘bioinancialisation’. hey 
summarise bioinancialisation in the following way:
he underlying logic of the culture of (inancial) valuation is that the worth of goods, things, 
activities and spaces can be essentially translated into inancial evaluations…. Financial value 
is here used to express the primacy of investment value over other values (aesthetic, use, 
moral, ecological, material, cultural) that predominantly assess the future monetary proit to 
be gained from potentially any ield of life or the environment. (Lilley & Papadopoulos, 2014, 
p. 974, emphasis in the original)
In short it is not only that financialisation pervades everyday life (Martin, 2002) but that 
‘the very ontology of our everyday lives’ (Lilley & Papadopoulos, 2014, p. 972) is trans-
formed into transactions only calculable in financial terms. Biofinancialisation artic-
ulates the penetration of finance into the very recesses of subjectivity. This argument 
echoes through Bradford and Hey’s (2007) discussion of the contemporary landscape 
of subjectivity, that these days ‘it seems impermissible for the citizen to be anything 
other than successful’ (p. 596). The measure of success is calculated in financial terms 
such as the value of assets or the size of income. What is more, ‘although different scales 
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of evaluation are by definition incommensurable … the worth of almost everything 
… is in principle transferable into one single logic of financial value that is potentially 
tradable in the market’ (Lilley & Papadopoulos, 2014, p. 974). Hence, the ‘wider bene-
fits’ of higher education such as ‘improved health outcomes’ are framed as ‘the reduced 
likelihood of requiring public sector assistance in relation to healthcare’ (Department 
of Business, Innovation and Skills [BIS], 2011, p. 11) with the concomitant savings in 
spending thereon.
Such evaluations in themselves may be said to be simple expressions of the political 
economy of higher education rather than the manifestation of a culture of value attribution. 
However, it is pertinent for analyses in this arena that (bio)inancialisation itself also relies 
on ‘privileged access to education and socio-cultural capital’ (Lilley & Papadopoulos, 2014, 
p. 977). In other words there is a dynamic between the criteria for evaluation, the methods 
of evaluation and the object of evaluation. Hence it is not simply that economic evaluations 
of higher education relect the inancialisation of everyday life; they ‘perform and reproduce’ 
it (Lilley & Papadopoulos, 2014, p. 980).
This becomes apparent in the kind of language used in political rhetoric about the 
value of higher education (and I remind readers here of the specific setting of my argu-
ments in the context of higher education in England). It is audible even in statements 
that purport to transcend the economic and the instrumental. There is reference for 
example to the ‘rich cultural scene and social scene’ (Directgov, 2012; emphasis added) 
that university (much used but erroneous shorthand for higher education) provides. The 
use of ‘rich’ rather than say ‘diverse’, ‘fertile’ or ‘expansive’ is telling, as are references to 
‘realising one’s potential’ because of the primacy of investment value over other values. 
Indeed much of the political discourse regarding the social and personal value of higher 
education constitutes an ‘ideological displacement’ (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & 
Roberts, 1978) in which the influence of (bio)financialisation as a culture of valuation 
is nevertheless apparent.
(Bio)inancialisation therefore has a theoretical function inasmuch as it explains the 
origins and use of economic and mercantile measures in evaluations of higher education. 
Nevertheless questions remain about ‘the enormity of the embrace’ it describes (Lilley & 
Papadopoulos, 2014, p. 982). How great is the potential for the evolution of alternative 
cultures of valuation and how might this then inluence research? It is to this question I 
turn in the second part of the paper.
Towards an alternative culture of valuation
Lilley and Papadopoulos (2014, p. 980) state: ‘our semiotic-ontological access to the world 
is organised through cultures of valuation to such an extent that one cannot simply with-
draw from these cultures without dismantling one’s own existence’. In other words, it is 
not suicient to critique existing cultures or the way they shape and direct research into 
higher education. ‘(M)anifestly superior successor systems or practices are needed before 
it becomes rational to remove what we have at present’ (Sayer, 2011, p. 227). herefore I 
am proposing that lay normativity as culture of valuation, based on Sayer’s (2011) concept 
of the same name, can serve as a culture of valuation that can inluence the way in which 
value is understood and researched.
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Deining lay normativity as a concept
Lay normativity expresses the evaluative relationship people have to the world. It is derived 
from the argument that most people make everyday value judgements and, moreover, they 
do so because they care deeply. his does not mean that we all care in the same or mutually 
supportive ways or that we care about the same things. Some people may care deeply about 
that which others may ind abhorrent. But most people ‘are sentient, evaluative beings: we 
don’t just think and interact but evaluate things including the past and the future’ (Sayer, 
2011, p. 1, emphasis in the original).
And yet social science has a habit of disregarding LN, turning instead to ‘concepts such 
as convention, habit, discourses, socialisation, reciprocity, exchange, discipline, power and a 
host of others’ that produce ‘an anodyne account of living that renders our evident concern 
about what we do and what happens to us incomprehensible’ (Sayer, 2011, p. 2). hey are 
descriptive rather than explanatory concepts that say little about ‘people’s irst person eval-
uative relation to the world and the force of their evaluations’ (Sayer, 2011, p. 2, emphasis in 
the original). Although he considers ‘lay normativity’ ‘a rather alienated way of describing 
it’ (p. 2), Sayer uses this term nonetheless as a shorthand for the nature and strength of this 
evaluative orientation.
here are two crucial qualiications in understanding the import of LN. First LN is not 
synonymous with the expression of preference or choice, or of opinion. his would be to dis-
count the force of this orientation, which is imbued with ethical and moral dimensions. his 
is not to say that LN is something ‘other’ than the ability to reason and to apply logic. Indeed 
the distinction between evaluation and reason is a false one, part of a family of dualisms such 
as fact–value; is–ought; reason–emotion; positive–normative and objectivity–subjectivity 
that were created at the end of the eighteenth century and which are institutionalised in the 
academy through the division between social science and philosophy. Sayer (2011, p. 29) 
also points out that these do not represent dichotomies that are impervious to challenge. 
Indeed the idea that values are beyond reason is dependent on any number of historically, 
socially and culturally contingent moves which can be foregrounded and made visible.
he second qualiication with regard to LN is that the inclusion of a normative standpoint 
is not necessarily essentialising. A normative standpoint does not create conditions capa-
ble of ‘dangerously naturalising and homogenising contingent social forms’ (Sayer, 2011, 
p. 243). Indeed, arguing for LN makes little sense if one ignores the fact that people have 
their own susceptibilities, as well as manifesting those of the particular society in which 
they happen to live. It is the situated, dynamic relationship between the individual and his/
her circumstances that is of paramount importance here.
Lay normativity as a culture of valuation
It is important to reiterate that a culture of valuation does not ofer criteria that can be 
applied wholesale to the measurement of value. It is the prevailing wind that sets the course 
of thinking, the antecedent inluence on how value is understood and the lens through 
which something is seen to count as valuable. In short, cultures of valuation furnish not 
the ‘metrics’, but the context for judgements about value. LN functions in this way by fore-
grounding an evaluative relationship to the world rooted in ‘everyday thought, practice and 
social arrangements in order to reveal what everyday thought fails to register’ (Sayer, 2011, 
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p. 216). Like class, a culture of valuation is ‘something which in fact happens (and can be 
shown to have happened)’ (hompson, 1966, p. 9). In this sense LN opens up new spaces 
for considering value and is therefore qualitatively diferent from a framework that always 
and already delineates an evaluative space.
hat notwithstanding, the world is ‘not just any way and not just any action will be suc-
cessful in changing it’ (Sayer, 2011, p. 222). It is therefore not suicient to position LN as a 
culture of valuation without setting out how its relevance extends ‘beyond ideas to practices 
themselves’ (Sayer, 2011, p. 221). he question, therefore, is how the inluence of LN as a 
culture of valuation translates into the practices of research into higher education. It is to 
this question I will now turn, focusing speciically on the practice of analysis. I relect on the 
inluence of LN as a culture of valuation on the constitution, the vantage points and the scope 
of analysis, and I do so by considering how lay normativity is manifested in the Capability 
Approach (CA). CA is ‘a new theoretical paradigm’ (Nussbaum, 2011, p. x) and evaluative 
system (Sen, 1999) that is being applied chiely to development policy but which has also 
taken hold in academic contexts (Robeyns, 2006), including that of education (Hinchlife 
& Terzi, 2009).
Sayer has noted the ‘complementarities’ between his thinking and that of CA, which has 
at its heart a consideration of the ‘relation between individual freedom and the achievement 
of social development’ (Sen, 1999, p. 4). It is also possible to understand CA as a culture 
of valuation in its own right (Sen, 1999, p. 29) and as culture of valuation in the ield of 
educational research (Hart, 2009, 2013, p. 179) and higher education research (Walker & 
Boni, 2013). But here I am treating CA as a conceptual and evaluative framework in which 
the inluence of LN can be detected rather than discussing the attributes and merits of CA 
itself, not least because there is already a signiicant literature on CA whereas, as Sayer 
argues, there is still much work to do in foregrounding and developing LN.
Another reason for focusing on lay normativity is that CA was conceived and developed 
by the economist Amartya Sen (1973, 1999) as an alternative way of thinking about and 
measuring well-being and inequality (besides the growth of gross national product, or a 
rise in personal incomes) in the arena of development. Indeed CA is also known as ‘the 
Human Development Approach’ (Nussbaum, 2011, p. x). herefore its relevance is oten to 
conditions of, sometimes extreme, deprivation. Its application in so-,called aluent soci-
eties such as in England which is the context for my discussion, is not as well researched 
or conceptualised, although it has by no means been ignored (Sen, 1983; see also Volkert 
& Schneider, 2011 for a review of the literature). Nevertheless LN as culture of valuation 
is apparent in CA concerns with agency and well-being (Sen, 1999), with the quality of 
life (Nussbaum & Sen, 1993) and with human lourishing (Nussbaum, 2011) and these, I 
contend, are able to travel across time and space.
Lay normativity and the constitution of analysis
hinking about analysis under the inluence of LN entails an interrogation of some a priori 
ideas that make up notions of value, such as advantage and disadvantage (Hattam & Smyth, 
2014), participation, aspiration (Hart, 2013) and success (Bradford & Hey, 2007). It also 
involves the exercise of practical reason, which Nussbaum (2000, p. 79; 2011, p. 34) describes 
as ‘being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical relection about 
the planning of one’s life’. his in turn requires a degree of relexivity that is largely absent 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
om
pu
tin
g &
 L
ibr
ary
 Se
rv
ice
s, 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
 H
ud
de
rsf
iel
d]
 at
 00
:57
 22
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
5 
CambrIDge Journal of eDuCaTIon  9
from current evaluations of higher education (Walker, 2006). On these terms the value of 
higher education is not measured on criteria external to the individual, such as how long 
it takes a graduate to ind a job, nor by average earnings, nor by how graduates contribute 
to the economy, nor whether someone conforms to a pre-determined idea of a ‘cultivated’ 
or ‘successful’ citizen.
Goodson (2014), echoing Mills (1959), also indicates a methodological strand to this 
point when he insists that ‘we have to understand the personal and biographical if we are to 
understand the social and political’ (p. 1). Research oten proceeds ‘in ignorance or denial 
of personal missions and biographical mandates’, but Goodson argues that these are ‘a good 
place to locate our studies (and indeed our policies), not reluctantly at the end of a process, 
but enthusiastically at the beginning’ (p. 1). heir inclusion implicitly foregrounds the pri-
macy of ‘what matters to people’, which also implies a greater role for narrative approaches, 
which are a vehicle for irst-person expressions of what is to count as valuable. here is a 
cautionary note to be sounded here because when we ask someone what matters to them 
there is the danger that ‘(w)hat we capture, in fact, is a mediation between the personal 
voice and wider cultural imperatives’ (Goodson, 2005, p. 215) and constraints (see Bridges, 
2006; Elster, 1983; Nussbaum, 2000 and Watts, 2009 and 2013 for treatments of the concept 
of adaptive or adapted preference for example). Stipulating that there must be reason to 
value something alludes to a complex matrix of individual agency and normative ideas that 
constitute reasonable grounds for judgement about the conditions in which individuals live.
he inluence of LN on the constitution of analysis inds expression in CA in the key 
concept of capabilities and functionings. Capabilities refer to the substantial and substantive 
freedoms we each enjoy to live a life we value (Sen, 1992, p. 81) and, crucially, have reason 
to value (1999, p.18). Functionings are the states and activities (beings and doings) that 
constitute the life we value (Sen, 1999, p. 75). Sen (1999) states that the evaluative focus 
can either be on the ‘realised functionings (what a person is actually able to do) or on the 
capability set of alternatives she has (her real opportunities)’ (p. 75, original emphasis). he 
salient point is that value is not measured in terms of the resources that higher education 
may ofer, such as a good job or a higher income. A person may have both and, moreover, 
feel compelled to pursue both in order not to ‘waste their education’ (Levitas, 1998). But 
if they are not leading a life they value – because long hours and a stressful working envi-
ronment keep them away from the family life they might value more for example – then 
higher education has not expanded that person’s capabilities.
Lay normativity and analytical vantage points
Currently much educational research fails to proceed genuinely from the perspective of 
what matters to the individual, privileging instead particular disciplinary or methodological 
traditions or conceptual frameworks and/or imposing evaluative criteria, such as income, 
that are external to the individual. Moreover, measuring value in terms of an expanded 
capability set and/or realised functionings (Hart, 2013; Walker, 2006; Watts, 2009) does not 
automatically signal a change in analytical perspective. he measures are still applied to, 
rather than emanating from, the person. he crucial qualiication here is that individuals 
themselves stipulate that which they value. In this respect embedding CA in LN as a culture 
of valuation transforms the import of analysis, which in turn sheds light on the dynamics 
of individual freedoms and societal factors.
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Moreover, value cannot be understood solely in terms of a person’s achievements (Hart, 
2013, p. 27) and ‘(t)he bettering of a human life does not have to be justiied by showing 
that a person with a better life is also a better producer’ (Drèze & Sen, 1995, p. 184). Nor can 
it ‘be assumed that time spent in an educational institution (be it a school or university) is 
commensurate with the expansion of capabilities’ (Hart, 2013, p. 46). he crucial point for 
our purposes here is that LN, the irst-person evaluative relationship with the world, sits 
at the heart of evaluations of what people have reason to value, and in evaluating whether 
higher education furnishes those possibilities.
In this sense looking out from the vantage point of participants is a diferent notion from 
that of ‘giving voice’ to those currently excluded from research. As mentioned earlier, there 
is no evidence that any groups or individuals are able to transcend, at least not entirely, 
the contexts in which they are located. We do better here to aim for understanding the 
inluence of those contexts. ‘Giving voice’ does not equate to creating the conditions for 
engaging in meaningful dialogue or for tracing the contours of the relationship between 
the person and his/her social locations (Pelias, 2015). LN as a culture of valuation does 
facilitate these actions. Nor is a focus on analytical vantage points a reference to stand-
point epistemology (Harding, 1992) because ‘(c)ontemporary standpoint theorists have 
denied that standpoints are merely socially located perspectives’ (Intemann, 2010, p. 785). 
Standpoint theory, moreover, ‘is accomplished by communities, not individuals’ (Inteman, 
2010, p. 786), whereas LN foregrounds an individual’s susceptibilities to and dynamic with 
their social and historical locations.
Reference to the primacy of the individual should not be mistaken for the erasure of 
the social, however. A particular concept of the individual is at work here. Robeyns (2005) 
distinguishes between ethical individualism, which ‘makes a claim about who or what should 
count in our evaluative exercises and decisions’ (p. 107), methodological individualism, ‘the 
doctrine that all social phenomena can in principle be explained in terms of individuals and 
their properties’ (p. 108), and ontological individualism where society ‘is nothing more than 
the sum of individuals and their properties’ (p. 108). Within capabilities, the reference is to 
the ethical individual. It is not akin to hierarchical, status-dependent social separateness 
and the individual is not an isolated being but one who has strong connections to the social 
context in which they are located.
Lay normativity and analytical scope
Research into higher education under the inluence of LN entails expanding the reach and 
depth of analysis to include that which is currently excluded. For example, in social scientiic 
educational research there is currently a greater focus on working-class ‘non-participation’ 
in higher education in both policy and research than on middle-class non-participation, 
relecting a long tradition in that ield of focusing on the ‘underdog’ (Becker, 1970). It 
also relects a concern with ‘disadvantage’ as potential students from working-class back-
grounds are not entering institutes of higher education in the numbers that policy intended. 
However, this concentration on working-class non-participation and its framing as a sign of 
disadvantage has tended to perpetuate rather than counter a deicit model of the working 
classes, particularly the white working classes (Skeggs, 2004), not only in terms of the rhet-
oric of aspiration (Milburn, 2012) but also as relecting working-class moral worth (Sayer, 
2005). Middle-class ‘non-participation’ in higher education meanwhile tends to be treated 
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in qualitatively diferent ways in both policy rhetoric and in research, and is positioned 
discursively as ‘self-exclusion’ for example (Whitty, 2001). When systems and processes of 
valuation that emanate from sources external to personal values and evaluative relationships 
are applied in research, working-class practices thus can be, and are, construed as ‘other’, to 
those of their middle-class counterparts (Bourdieu, 1986; Skeggs, 2004).
Nussbaum (2011) has created a list of capabilities that are essential for human lourishing. 
Although this move has not been universally endorsed, least of all by Sen (2004), it never-
theless shits the emphasis in discourses of aspiration and in policy. It is no longer taken for 
granted that higher education always and already provides that which only those lacking in 
aspiration would reject (a theme in the culture of privileged intrinsicality). Instead higher 
education is held to account against the extent to which it fosters the speciied capabilities. 
In the capability space, therefore, we can also move beyond an interrogation of the value 
of participation in higher education, to ask questions about the value of non-participation 
(Watts & Bridges, 2006).
CA therefore does much work in opening out analysis re-focusing attention, and 
 re-framing and re-coniguring key concepts such as disadvantage in ways that are steeped 
in a culture of lay normativity. Taking the expansion of an individual’s capability set, or 
their realised functionings as a unit of evaluation, provides ‘a new and powerful vocabulary 
for re-thinking dominant discourses of HE’ and, importantly, ‘new constructions of HE’ 
(Hart, 2013, p. 179, emphasis added). It creates and invites questions oten omitted from 
analyses of the value of higher education such as ‘Of value to whom?’, ‘aspiring to what?’, 
‘achievement of what?’, and ‘disadvantaged by what?’ Asking the question, ‘What matters 
to a person?’ evokes a temporal element frequently missing from educational research. 
Inasmuch as LN must entail consideration of a person’s (changing) relationships over time 
and their emotions (Nussbaum, 2001) the operation of lay normativity also transforms the 
import of the expansion of capabilities and realised functionings so they can be seen as 
more than measures.
Conclusion
In this paper I started from the claim that educational research on higher education does 
not pay suicient heed to the cultures of valuation in which it is embedded. I proceeded on 
the premises that analyses of the value of higher education seem predicated on ideas that are 
more oten implied and assumed than established and look to versions of the future, rather 
than concentrating on its value in the present. I argued that focusing on the present would 
irst require taking a step back to consider the cultures of valuation in which research on 
higher education is currently embedded, and the inluences they exert on analyses of the 
value of higher education. I started by considering two such cultures: privileged intrinsicality 
and (bio)inancialisation. In order to ‘develop a positive educational project out of critique’ 
(Hattam & Smyth, 2014, p. 272), I then set out Sayer’s (2011) concept of lay normativity, 
foregrounding how it might function as an alternative culture of valuation. Finally I set out 
how it might be translated into the practices of research on higher education, speciically the 
practice of analysis. I animated my arguments by focusing on the manifestation of LN in the 
capability approach and how key concepts in CA might be transformed when embedded 
in a culture of lay normativity.
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I have let a number of points in need of attention and/or further development. First, 
other ‘cultures of valuation’ could be identiied and their inluence interrogated. In par-
ticular I have introduced only a limited version of the capability approach but noted that 
it might also serve as a culture of valuation for higher education as it already ‘ofers a new 
space to evaluate what is of value in education’ (Hart, 2013, p. 47). his would also include a 
confrontation with how CA can be applied in contexts of relative privilege, how it accounts 
for changes over time and how measures of value could be transformed into expressions of 
value. Second, a research culture that values LN needs to be further evolved and progressed 
as well as tested methodologically through ‘real world’ projects. hird, we need a clear idea 
of how existing approaches to the study of higher education it within this more expansive 
notion of a culture of valuation.
Despite these limitations, locating educational research within a culture of valuation that 
not only takes people’s evaluative orientations and concerns seriously but also takes them as 
paramount at the very least signals a way of ‘thinking against the grain of orthodoxies’ so as 
to mitigate the ‘damaging efect of foreclosure’ (Hattam & Smyth, 2014, p. 271). Focusing on 
cultures of valuation in general raises awareness that no analysis of value is self-supporting 
or self-referential and that all activity, including research, is under the inluence of particular 
cultures of valuation. Embedding higher education research in a culture of LN sidesteps the 
prevailing and limiting terms of debates regarding the value of higher education and attends 
to what higher education is as well as what it might be or ought to be. More ambitiously, 
by providing accounts of higher education that resonate with what matters to them and 
why, it also has the potential to render its indings of beneit to constituencies currently 
overlooked, homogenised or essentialised in current research.
Acknowledgements
he author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers of this paper whose generous and 
insightful reading of earlier drats of this paper helped her to think more deeply about her ideas 
than would have otherwise been the case. he author is likewise indebted to Carol Taylor, to Annie 
Yeadon-Lee and also to James Downs who again volunteered to be her ‘lay reader’.
Disclosure statement
No potential conlict of interest was reported by the author.
References
Archer, L. (2003). he ‘value’ of higher education. In L. Archer, M. Hutchings, & A. Ross (Eds.), 
Higher education and social class: Issues of exclusion and inclusion (pp. 121–136). Abingdon: 
Routledgefalmer.
Barnett, R. (1990). he idea of higher education. Buckingham: SRHE and Open University Press.
Becker, H. (1970). Sociological work: Method and substance. Chicago, IL: Aldine.
Bhatti, G. (2003). Social justice and non–traditional participants in higher education. In C. Vincent 
(Ed.), Social justice, education and identity (pp. 65–82). London: Routledgefalmer.
Blake, N., Smith, R., & Standish, P. (1998). he universities we need: Higher education ater Dearing. 
London: Kogan Page.
Boni, A., & Gasper, D. (2012). Rethinking the quality of universities: How can human development 
thinking contribute? Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 13, 451–470. doi:10.1080/
19452829.2012.679647
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
om
pu
tin
g &
 L
ibr
ary
 Se
rv
ice
s, 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
 H
ud
de
rsf
iel
d]
 at
 00
:57
 22
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
5 
CambrIDge Journal of eDuCaTIon  13
Boni, A., & Walker, M. (Eds.). (2013). Human development and capabilities: Re-imagining the university 
of the twenty-irst century. Abingdon: Routledge.
Bourdieu, P. (1986). Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste. London: Routledge.
Bowes, L., homas, L., Peck, L., & Nathwani, T. (2013). International research on the efectiveness of 
widening participation. Bristol: HEFCE and OFFA.
Bradford, S., & Hey, V. (2007). Successful subjectivities: he successiication of class, ethnic and gender 
positions. Journal of Education Policy, 22, 595–614. doi:10.1080/02680930701625205
Bridges, D. (2006). Adaptive preference, justice and identity in the context of widening participation 
in higher education. Ethics and Education, 1, 15–28. doi:10.1080/17449640600584946
Bukodi, E., & Goldthorpe J. (2011). Social class returns to higher education: Chances of access to the 
professional and managerial salariat for men in three British birth cohorts. Longitudinal and Life 
Course Studies, 2, 185–201. Retrieved from 10.14301/llcs.v2i2.122
Department for Business Innovation and Skills [BIS]. (2011). he returns to higher education 
qualiications. London: Department for Business Innovation and Skills.
Department for Business Innovation and Skills [BIS]. (2013). hings we know and don’t know about 
the wider beneits of higher education: A review of the recent literature. London: Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills.
Directgov (2012). he beneits of higher education. Retrieved from http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121015000000/http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/EducationAndLearning/
UniversityAndHigherEducation/WhyGoToUniversityOrCollege/DG_4016998.
Dowling, E., & Harvie, D. (2014). Harnessing the social: State, crisis and (Big) society. Sociology, 48, 
869–886. doi:10.1177/0038038514539060
Drèze, J., & Sen, A. (1995). India: Economic development and social opportunity. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Elster, J. (1983). Sour grapes: Studies in the subversion of rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
George, S. (2014). Re-imagined universities and global citizen professionals: International education, 
cosmopolitan pedagogies and global friendships. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Goodson, I. (2005). Learning, curriculum, life politics: he selected works of Ivor F. Goodson. London: 
Routledge.
Goodson, I. (2013). Developing narrative theory: Life histories and personal representation. London: 
Routledge.
Goodson, I. (2014). Curriculum, personal narrative and the social future. London: Routledge.
Goodson, I., & Lindblad, S. (2011). Conclusions: Developing a conceptual framework for understanding 
professional knowledge. In I. Goodson & S. Lindblad (Eds.), Professional knowledge and educational 
restructuring in Europe (pp. 99–109). Rotterdam: Sense.
Haiven, M. (2014). Cultures of inancialization: Fictitious capital in popular culture and everyday life. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jeferson, T., Clarke, J., & Roberts, B. (1978). Policing the crisis – Mugging, the 
state, law and order. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Halsey, A., Heath, A., & Ridge, J. (1980). Origins and destinations: Family, class and education in 
modern Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harding, S. (1992). Ater the neutrality ideal: Science, politics, and ‘strong objectivity’. Social Research, 
59, 567–587. Retrieved from Business Source Complete, Accession No. 9301150004
Hart, C. S. (2009). Quo Vadis? he capability space and new directions for the philosophy of 
educational research. Studies in Philosophy & Education, 28, 391–402. doi:10.1007/s11217-009-
9128-4
Hart, C. S. (2013). Aspirations, education and social justice: Applying Sen and Bourdieu. London: 
Continuum.
Hattam, R., & Smyth, J. (2014). hinking past educational disadvantage, and theories of reproduction. 
Sociology, 49, 270–286. doi:10.1177/0038038514540578
Hinchlife, G., & Terzi, L. (2009). Introduction to the special issue ‘Capabilities and Education’. Studies 
in Philosophy and Education, 28, 387–390.
Intemann, K. (2010). 25 years of feminist empiricism and standpoint theory: Where are we now? 
Hypatia, 25, 778–796. doi: 10.1111/j.1527-2001.2010.01138.x
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
om
pu
tin
g &
 L
ibr
ary
 Se
rv
ice
s, 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
 H
ud
de
rsf
iel
d]
 at
 00
:57
 22
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
5 
14  Y. DownS
Jenkins, A., Jones, L., & Ward, A. (2001). he long term efects of a degree on graduate lives. Studies 
in Higher Education, 26, 147–161. doi:10.1080/03075070124527
Levitas, R. (1998). he inclusive society? Social exclusion and new labour. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Lilley, S., & Papadopoulos, D. (2014). Material returns: Cultures of valuation, bioinancialisation and 
the autonomy of politics. Sociology, 48, 972–988. doi:10.1177/0038038514539206
Martin, R. (2002). he inancialization of daily life. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Mcmahon, W. (2009). Higher learning, greater good: he private and social beneits of higher education. 
Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.
McNicol, S. (2004). Access to higher education among lower socio–economic groups: A historical 
perspective. Journal of Access Policy and Practice, 1, 162–170. Retrieved from http://www.
ingentaconnect.com/content/niace/japp/2004/00000001/00000002/art00007
Milburn, A. (2012). Fair access to professional careers: A progress report by the independent reviewer 
on social mobility and child poverty. London: Cabinet Oice.
Mills, C. W. (1959). he sociological imagination. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Newman, J. H. (1852/2014). he idea of a university. N.p.: Assumption Press. [First published 1852, 
London: Longmans: Green & Co)].
Nussbaum, M. (2000). Women and human development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nussbaum, M. (2001). Upheavals of thought: he intelligence of emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Nussbaum, M. (2011). Creating capabilities: he human development approach. Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Nussbaum, M., & Sen, A. (1993). Introduction. In M. Nussbaum & A. Sen (Eds.), Quality of life (pp. 
1–6). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pelias, R. (2015). A story located in ‘shoulds’: Toward a productive future for qualitative inquiry. 
Qualitative Inquiry, 21, 609–611. doi:10.1177/1078004/4555073
Preston, J., & Green, A. (2003). he macro-social beneits of education, Training and skills in comparative 
perspective. (Wider Beneits of Learning Report No. 9). London: Centre for Research on the Wider 
Beneits of Learning.
Robbins, L. (1963). Higher education: he report of the committee appointed by the Prime Minister 
under the Chairmanship of Lord Robbins. London: HMSO.
Robeyns, I. (2005). he capability approach: A theoretical survey. Journal of Human Development, 
6, 93–117. doi:10.1080/146498805200034266
Robeyns, I. (2006). he capability approach in practice. he Journal of Political Philosophy, 14, 351–
376. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2006.00263.x.
Salmon, C. (2010). Storytelling: Bewitching the modern mind. London: Verso.
Sayer, A. (2005). he moral signiicance of class. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sayer, A. (2011). Why things matter to people. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Scott, P. (1995). he meanings of mass higher education. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Sen, A. (1973). On economic inequality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sen, A. (1983). Poor, relatively speaking. Oxford Economic Papers, 35, 153–169. Retrieved from http://
oep.oxfordjournals.org.libaccess.hud.ac.uk/content/35/2/153.full.pdf+html
Sen, A. (1992). Inequality re–examined. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sen, A. (2004). Capabilities, lists, and public reason: Continuing the conversation. Feminist Economics, 
10, 77–80. doi:10.1080/1354570042000315163
Skeggs, B. (2004). Class, self, culture. London: Routledge.
Stevens, R. (2004). University to uni. London: Politico.
hompson, E.P. (1966). he making of the English working class. New York, NY: Knopf.
University Alliance. (2014). Closing the gap: Unlocking opportunity through higher education. London: 
University Alliance.
Volkert, J., & Schneider, F. G. (2011). he application of the capability approach to high–income 
OECD countries: A preliminary survey. CESifo working paper: Public Finance, 3364. Retrieved 
from http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46316.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
om
pu
tin
g &
 L
ibr
ary
 Se
rv
ice
s, 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
 H
ud
de
rsf
iel
d]
 at
 00
:57
 22
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
5 
CambrIDge Journal of eDuCaTIon  15
Walker, M. (2006). Towards a capability–based theory of social justice for education policy–making. 
Journal of Education Policy, 21, 163–185. doi:10.1080/02680930500500245
Walker, M., & Boni, A. (2013). Higher education and human development: Towards the public and 
social good. In A. Boni & M. Walker (Eds.), Human development and capabilities:Re-imagining 
the university of the twenty-irst century (pp. 15–29). Abingdon: Routledge.
Watts, M. (2009). Sen and the art of motorcycle maintenance. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 
28, 425–436. doi:0.1007/s11217-009-9127-5
Watts, M. (2013). he complexities of adaptive preferences in post-compulsory education: Insights 
from the fable of the fox and the grapes. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 14, 
503–519. doi:10.1080/19452829.2013.800847
Watts, M., & Bridges, D. (2006). he value of non–participation in education. Journal of Education 
Policy, 21, 267–290. doi:10.1080/02680930600600267
Whitty, G. (2001). Education, social class and social exclusion. Journal of Education Policy, 16, 
287–295. doi:10.1080/02680930110054308
Wolf, A. (2002). Does education matter? Myths about education and economic growth. London: 
Penguin.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
om
pu
tin
g &
 L
ibr
ary
 Se
rv
ice
s, 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
 H
ud
de
rsf
iel
d]
 at
 00
:57
 22
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
5 
